Jason Barr v. County of Clarion by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-14-2011 
Jason Barr v. County of Clarion 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Jason Barr v. County of Clarion" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1667. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1667 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 10-1822 
_______________ 
 
JASON BARR, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE COUNTY OF CLARION, ADULT PROBATION/PAROLE OFFICER 
ELIZABETH B. GRAHAM and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:08-cv-866) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nora Barry Fischer 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before: FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, Senior District 
Judge
*
 
 
(Opinion filed March 14, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
                                              
*
 Honorable Louis H. Pollak, District Judge of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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POLLAK, District Judge 
 Plaintiff Jason Barr appeals from the District Court‟s order granting summary 
judgment to the defendants for alleged violations of Barr‟s due process rights.  For the 
following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are of course fully familiar with 
the background of this case, we set forth only the facts and procedural history that are of 
central relevance to our decision.  On November 4, 1998, Barr was sentenced to seven 
years of probation for forgery and theft by unlawful taking by the Clarion County Court 
of Common Pleas.  On July 18, 2001, Barr was arrested for driving under the influence 
and possession of marijuana.  This conduct violated the terms of his probation, prompting 
the district attorney‟s office to recommend to the Court of Common Pleas that Barr‟s 
probation be revoked and that he be imprisoned and sentenced to additional probation.  
On December 20, 2001, Judge James G. Arner (“Judge Arner”) of the Court of Common 
Pleas held a revocation hearing at which the prosecutor and Barr‟s public defender agreed 
to the sentencing recommendations, including a five-year probation term.  Because of a 
transcription error, however, the order issued by Judge Arner on that date included all of 
the sentencing recommendations except for the five-year probation term.   
On February 20, 2002, Elizabeth Graham (“Graham”), Barr‟s probation officer, 
wrote a letter to Judge Arner which said the following: 
Dear Judge Arner: 
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On December 20, 2001, Jason Barr was sentenced at a [revocation] hearing 
on a probation violation.  It was my recommendation and the 
recommendation of the District Attorney that Jason [Barr] receive a 
sentence of [not less than] twenty-three days nor more than two years less 
one day, followed by a consecutive five year probation period.  
 
After checking with [court stenographer] Barb Everman, she said that her 
notes indicated that the consecutive probation period was [ADA Mark 
Aaron‟s] recommendation, but that it did not appear in the order.  Do you 
have any objection to signing the attached amended order, which includes 
the consecutive probation?  Jason [Barr] agreed to the recommendation at 
the hearing. 
 
Thank you for reviewing this matter.  If you have any questions, please 
contact me.   
 
Respectfully, 
Elizabeth B. Graham 
Adult Probation/Parole Officer 
 
Graham did not provide a copy of this letter, or the enclosed proposed order, to the 
district attorney, to Barr, or to Barr‟s public defender.  Judge Arner signed the proposed 
order on February 25, 2002, and Barr‟s sentence was amended and extended by an 
additional five years of probationary supervision.  Judge Arner did not give notice to the 
district attorney, to Barr, or to Barr‟s public defender before issuing the amended order.   
 In November of 2005 and July of 2006, Barr violated the conditions of his 
probation and was incarcerated for a total of 188 days.  On October 10, 2006, Barr filed a 
petition to vacate illegal sentence in the Court of Common Pleas.  The petition argued 
that under 42 Pa. C.S. § 5505,
1
 a sentencing court may only amend a sentence within 
                                              
1
 See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5505 (“Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court 
upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, 
notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order 
has been taken or allowed.”).   
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thirty days of the initial order.   Noting that sixty-seven days passed between the entry of 
the original sentence and the issuance of the amended order, the petition argued that the 
amended order was illegal and void ab initio.  On October 13, 2006, Judge Arner granted 
the petition.
2
   
 Thereafter, Barr filed the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that 
defendants—probation officer Graham and the County of Clarion (“County”) 3—violated 
his constitutional due process rights.  Barr‟s complaint seeks to hold Graham individually 
liable for her actions which led to the modification of his sentence.  It also seeks to hold 
the County municipally liable because the Office of Adult Probation/Parole for Clarion 
County allegedly maintained a policy or custom of communicating with judges regarding 
criminal cases ex parte.  Following discovery, the District Court granted defendants‟ 
motion for summary judgment on February 23, 2010, finding that (1) Barr‟s claims were 
barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Barr had failed to establish that the defendants‟ 
conduct was the proximate cause of the alleged due process violation; (3) Barr failed to 
establish that the probation office‟s practice of communicating directly with Judge Arner 
was attributable to the County of Clarion; and (4) Barr‟s claims against defendant 
Graham were barred by qualified immunity.    
                                              
2
   As explained in footnote 7, infra, whether Judge Arner‟s amended order did violate § 
5505 is a matter of dispute.  We find it unnecessary to resolve that dispute in this appeal.  
We presume, as did the district court, the invalidity of the amended order.   
3
  The complaint also included claims against several Doe defendants.  Because Barr was 
not able to ascertain the identities of the Doe defendants after reasonable discovery, the 
district court dismissed these claims.  Barr has not appealed that ruling.    
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 Barr has appealed all of these rulings.  Because we agree that Barr has failed to 
demonstrate proximate cause—a failure that is fatal to his claims against both Graham 
and the County—we affirm the judgment of the District Court on that basis, without 
reaching the district court‟s other rulings. 4    
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Our standard of review applicable to an 
order granting summary judgment is plenary.”  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations omitted).  In exercising this review, “[w]e may affirm 
the order when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the facts 
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. (quotations and citations 
omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  We may affirm the District Court‟s summary judgment 
order on any grounds supported by the record.  Shook v. Avaya, 625 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
                                              
4
 We also grant the defendants‟ motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix.  Barr 
does not contest defendants‟ motion with respect to supplemental appendix pages 1-12.  
Barr does, however, object to supplemental appendix pages 13-14, which contain a letter 
from Judge Arner to defendants‟ counsel authored in December 2008 stating his 
“position” that defendant Graham “did not violate any of [Barr‟s] rights.”  Even if Barr is 
correct that Judge Arner‟s letter is hearsay not fitting within any exception, “hearsay 
statements can be considered on a motion for summary judgment if they are capable of 
admission at trial.”  Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 223 at n. 
2 (3d Cir.2000).  Because Judge Arner could “testify about the substance of [his letter] at 
trial,” Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 694 (3d Cir. 2009), the letter may be 
considered on a motion for summary judgment. 
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III. 
To properly state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment‟s Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must, among other things, establish that the 
defendant “subjected the plaintiff, or caused the plaintiff to be subjected to” the 
deprivation of a protected liberty interest without due process.  Sample v. Diecks, 885 
F.2d 1099, 1113 (3d Cir. 1989).  In evaluating causation, “[i]t is axiomatic that „[a] 
§ 1983 action, like its state tort analogs, employs the principle of proximate causation.‟”  
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Townes v. City of New York, 
176 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir.1999)); see also Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 
2000).  The concept of “proximate cause” has traditionally been defined “as a person‟s 
wrongful conduct which is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another.”  
Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 431).  However, “an intervening act of a third party, which actively operates to 
produce harm after the first person‟s wrongful act has been committed, is a superseding 
cause which prevents the first person from being liable for the harm which his antecedent 
wrongful act was a substantial factor in bringing about.”  Id. (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 440-441). 
In Egervary v. Young, we recognized that “the actions of a judicial officer may 
sever the chain of causation” between the wrongful act of a party who appeared before 
the judicial officer and the harm that befell another as a result.  Id. at 246.  In Egervary, 
we distinguished between a party‟s misrepresentations of law and misrepresentations of 
fact in determining whether the chain of causation was broken.  A judge‟s error of law is 
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generally sufficient to sever the chain of causation, even if a party misrepresented the 
state of the law to the judge, because “it is axiomatic that, in any given case, the 
responsibility for determining the governing law and procedures lies with the judge.”  Id. 
at 249.  However, because a judge depends on the party appearing before her to honestly 
state the facts relevant to the judge‟s decision, a judge‟s actions do not sever the chain of 
causation where the party makes “an inadequate or false representation of the factual 
basis upon which the legal ruling depended.”  Id.   
Egervary noted that the Second Circuit‟s decision in Warner v. Orange County 
Department of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997), suggests that some qualification 
of this general framework is called for when the case involves the conduct of a probation 
officer.  See Egervary, 366 F.3d at 249 n.7.
5
  The plaintiff in Warner brought a § 1983 
action against his probation department in Orange County, New York, alleging that a 
probation condition requiring his attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous (“A.A.”) 
meetings forced him to participate in religious activity in violation of the First 
Amendment‟s Establishment Clause.  The Warner court stated that:  
                                              
5
  Egervary did not involve conduct by a probation officer.  Rather, that case involved an 
international child custody dispute in which a private attorney, at the request of the State 
Department, agreed to represent the child‟s Hungarian father pro bono.  366 F.3d at 241.  
The private attorney appeared before the district judge at an ex parte hearing and 
persuaded the judge to issue an order requiring the child‟s mother to hand over the child 
to the private attorney for immediate transport to Hungary.  Id. at 241-42.  The attorney 
told the district court that the court was not required to provide the child‟s mother with a 
post-deprivation hearing, and the court did not provide such a hearing.  Id.  The mother 
later sued the private attorney for unconstitutionally infringing her due process rights.  In 
that suit, we held that due process required a post-deprivation hearing, but found that the 
attorney‟s “misrepresentation . . . [was] a legal one and not an inadequate or false 
representation of the factual basis upon which the legal ruling depended.”  Id. at 249.  We 
therefore held that the judge‟s action constituted a superseding cause.  Id.  
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The probation officer . . . is not a partisan advocate aligned with either the 
prosecutor or the defendant.  He is a neutral adviser to the court. . . . Given 
the neutral advisory role of the probation officer toward the court, it is an 
entirely natural consequence for a judge to adopt the [probation officer‟s] 
recommendations as to a therapy provider without making an independent 
investigation of the qualifications and procedures of the recommended 
provider.  
 
115 F.3d at 1072-73 (citations and alterations omitted).  In Egervary, which involved 
misrepresentations of law by a party involved in an international child custody dispute, 
we distinguished Warner on the ground that judges confronting attorneys “appearing in a 
partisan capacity . . . should „know[] that scrutiny is warranted.‟”  366 F.3d at 249 n.7 
(quoting Warner, 115 F.3d at 1072).   
 The District Court, relying on Egervary, held that Graham‟s letter was not the 
proximate cause of Barr‟s alleged due process injury because the letter contained no 
misrepresentations of fact and “the court acted as an intervening cause” by acting on the 
letter.  Appellant‟s Appendix at 11.  The District Court did not address Egervary‟s 
discussion of Warner in its opinion, and Barr argues that Warner‟s reasoning requires us 
to reverse the District Court‟s holding because this case involves an error by a probation 
officer upon whose advice it would be natural for the judge to rely.   
While it is true that Pennsylvania law, like the law of New York applied in 
Warner, requires that probation officers serve a neutral advisory role, see Commonwealth 
v. Rhodes, 990 A.2d 732, 747 (Pa. Super. 2009), we reject the argument that Warner 
supports a finding of proximate cause under the circumstances of this case.  Warner 
placed heavy emphasis upon the fact that: 
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[c]ourt adoption of the probation officer‟s recommendation is particularly 
likely when the recommendation deals with a provider of therapy.  Judges 
are unlikely to possess particularized information about the relative 
characteristics and merits of different providers of therapy.  For this type of 
information, courts generally rely heavily on probation department 
recommendations. 
 
115 F.3d at 1073.  In addition, the Warner court stressed that its: 
 
discussion relates only to the selection of a therapy provider and not at all 
to the court‟s determination of appropriateness of probation and of alcohol 
therapy. The selection of a provider of therapy is not an issue of law, and 
courts are ill equipped to perform this task without relying heavily on 
recommendations. 
 
Id. at 1073 n.4.  Thus, we understand Warner to articulate a rule that a judge‟s adoption 
of a probation officer‟s recommendation will not sever the chain of causation if the 
recommendation involves a determination that the judge is “ill equipped” to make 
without “relying heavily” on information provided by the probation officer.  Id.6 
 It is plain that Judge Arner was capable of determining, without any help from the 
probation office, under what circumstances he could amend a sentence after its issuance.  
Making this determination would presumably have required him to consult the relevant 
statutory provision which governs such amendments, see 42 Pa. C.S. § 5505, along with 
any judicial decisions construing that statute.  These are standard judicial tasks requiring 
no special outside expertise or knowledge, and for this reason Judge Arner was in a 
position to make an “independent exercise of judicial review.”   Egervary, 366 F.3d at 
                                              
6
 Of course, if a probation officer makes an “inadequate or false representation of the 
factual basis upon which [a] legal ruling depended,” a judge‟s order based on such a 
misrepresentation would not constitute a superseding cause.  Egervary, 366 F.3d at 249.  
Because Graham‟s letter does not contain any misrepresentation of fact, Barr cannot 
establish proximate cause on this basis. 
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248.  Thus, we hold that Graham‟s ex parte communication with Judge Arner cannot be 
considered the proximate cause of any due process deprivation Barr may have suffered as 
a result of Judge Arner‟s order.  Instead, at most,7 this appears to be one of those 
unfortunate cases in which the sentencing judge “fail[ed] in the primary judicial duty of 
identifying the legal principles and procedures which govern the dispute.”  Id. at 249.   
 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                              
7
 We note that there is some question regarding whether Judge Arner failed to comply 
with 42 Pa. C.S. § 5505 when he issued the amended order.  Defendants argue that he 
was permitted to amend the sentencing order more than 30 days after it was issued, 
pointing to Pennsylvania state court precedents which recognize an exception to Section 
5505 “where the mistake is patent and obvious.”  Commonwealth v. Walters, 814 A.2d 
253, 256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).  Thus, if we did not resolve this case on proximate cause 
grounds, we would have to address whether the mistake in this case was “patent and 
obvious.”  We would also have to determine whether, even if the mistake was “patent and 
obvious,” Judge Arner was nonetheless required to give “notice to the parties” prior to 
amending Barr‟s sentencing order.  See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5505 (“Except as otherwise 
provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind 
any order . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Because we find that Graham‟s actions could not 
have been the proximate cause of any due process violation Barr may have experienced, 
we do not reach these questions. 
